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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the Supreme Court severely limited the applicability of the Alien
Tort Statute by holding that foreign corporations cannot be defendants under
the current statute.1 By deciding the case on these grounds, however, the Court
avoided resolving a much broader question. The plaintiffs in Jesner, in an
attempt to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality that is embedded in U.S. statutory interpretation, argued that Arab Bank’s conduct did
“touch and concern” the United States with sufficient force to sustain a claim.2
The plaintiffs specifically focused on Arab Bank’s New York based dollarclearing operation.3
Each year globally, the U.S. Dollar is used in transactions totaling in the
trillions.4 Many of these transactions occur electronically, and often neither
the originator nor the receiver of the transaction is a U.S. person.5 Electronic
transactions must be cleared so that the originator’s and receiver’s accounts
are correctly adjusted.6 In the modern global financial system, accounts are
cleared electronically, with essentially zero human activity in the actual clearing process.7
The Supreme Court is far from the first court to dodge the delicate issue of
electronic payment systems. In a decision leading up to Jesner, the Second
Circuit wrote:
It seems to us to be unwise to decide the difficult and sensitive
issue of whether the clearing of foreign dollar-denominated
payments through a branch in New York could, under these
circumstances, displace the presumption against the
1
Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1405 (2018) (“Congress, not the Judiciary,
must decide whether to expand the scope of liability under the [Alien Tort Statute] to include foreign corporations.”).
2
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (finding that the
conduct sustaining an Alien Tort Statute claim must have some sufficient connection to the
United States).
3
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1394 (“[P]etitioners allege as well that Arab Bank used its New
York branch to clear dollar-denominated transactions” and that “some of these . . . transactions benefited terrorists.”)
4
David Scutt, Here’s How Much Currency is Traded Every Day, BUS. INSIDER (Sept.
2, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-much-currency-is-traded-every-day
-2016-9.
5
Julia Kagan, Wire Transfer, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.investopedi
a.com/terms/w/wiretransfer.asp.
6
Dietrich Domanski, Central Clearing: Trends and Current Issues, BIS (Dec. 6, 2015),
https://bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1512g.htm.
7
Tania Kishore Jaleel, What is Electronic Clearing Service (ECS)?, BUS. STANDARD
(Jan. 20, 2013), https://www.business-standard.com/article/pf/what-is-electronic-clearingservice-ecs-111070800019_1.html.
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extraterritorial application of the [Alien Torts Statute], when it
was not the focus of either the district court’s decision or the
briefing on appeal.8
Part of this apparently shared reluctance is undoubtedly because conclusively deciding whether dollar-clearing operations touch and concern the
United States will have significant policy implications, regardless of the decision. The Supreme Court is wary of turning itself into a court of global judicial
jurisdiction, as evidenced by its history of limiting the rights of foreign civil
plaintiffs to sue in U.S. court.9 At the same time, however, the United States
has pursued an aggressive global financial regulatory scheme often with the
potential for criminal liability. This global enforcement is sometimes justified
by relatively insignificant contact with U.S. territory or areas of jurisdiction.
The Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission have
both opined that dollar-clearing operations are enough to subject the entire
transaction and its participants to U.S. law.10 There are, of course, different
substantive policy considerations involved when the government is the party
bringing the suit. In the case of an enforcement action, the government has
already made the decision that the case is worth bringing in U.S. court—and
presumably any negative foreign policy implications were already considered
and overcome. In contrast, there is no sovereign filter when foreign plaintiffs
attempt to bring an action.11 While different concerns may animate a court’s
thinking, it is not clear that there is an easy method for treating the same action
differently in the civil or criminal context. Without a change to the underlying
statute, or a bifurcation of the law of extraterritoriality, a determination of
whether a particular activity is a sufficient nexus to the United States to be
territorial would cut across contexts. In this specific context, for example, a
determination that dollar-clearing could support criminal prosecution—based
on the activity’s touch and concern to the United States—would presumably
also support a civil action by a non-government plaintiff.
Given that a large portion of international transactions involve dollarclearing at some point, the status in U.S. law of dollar-clearing operations is
one of global financial concern.12 The United States has traditionally
8

In re Arab Bank, PLC, 808 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2015).
Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015).
10
15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (dd)(2) (West 1998); CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
AND THE ENF’T DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S.
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crim
inal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf.
11
For a more detailed discussion of these policy considerations, see infra pages 609–
610.
12
Chase Manhattan Bank v. State of Iran, 484 F.Supp 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 15, 1980)
(describing the U.S. dollar as “the recognized reserve currency for international trade”);
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1395 (“The CHIPS system is used for dollar-denominated transactions
9
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exercised significant influence in shaping the global economic system through
both foreign and domestic policy.13 However, continued indecisiveness on the
limits of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction has potential negative repercussions for
the entire global financial system and the norms surrounding regulation of a
system that at times appears to have no borders.
This Note will examine the treatment of currency-clearing operations in
U.S. law from the perspective of international financial institutions. First, this
Note will examine the presumption against extraterritoriality in U.S. law and
the norms regarding extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction in international
law. Next, this Note will examine the treatment of currency-clearing operations in relation to extraterritoriality in United States and selected foreign jurisdictions. Finally, this Note will argue that the United States, as a global
financial leader, should definitively establish a restrained approach to basing
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction on currency-clearing, with an eye
towards creating an international norm on the topic.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION IN UNITED STATES
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in United States Law and Its
Application
Historically, United States courts have limited the impact of domestic law
beyond the country’s borders.14 The modern theory of extraterritoriality, especially in the realm of financial crimes, was spawned by Oliver Wendell
Holmes in 1909.15 Holmes wrote in an early antitrust case that “the general
and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”16
The doctrine lost much of its bite, however, until the Supreme Court’s decision in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), where the Court
and for transactions where the dollar is used as an intermediate currency to fulfill a currency
exchange.”).
13
Christopher Smart, The Future of the Dollar — and Its Role in Financial Diplomacy,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Dec. 16, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/
2018/12/16/future-of-dollar-and-its-role-in-financial-diplomacy-pub-77986 (“In a world
of imperfect choices, other countries have come to rely on the U.S. record of building rulesbased financial institutions, proposing agendas for policy coordination and shaping progress toward open markets.”); see also Robert E. Litan, The “Globalization Challenge:
The U.S. Role in Shaping World Trade and Investment, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 2000),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-globalization-challenge-the-u-s-role-in-shapingworld-trade-and-investment/
14
See generally Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
15
William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85 (1998).
16
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (finding that the
Sherman Antitrust Act did not cover conduct occurring wholly within a foreign country).
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revived the presumption.17 Chief Justice Rehnquist there noted that “[i]t is a
longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless
a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”18 Importantly, Rehnquist was careful to state that
the presumption is only one of statutory construction; with explicit instruction,
Congress is free to pass laws governing conduct anywhere.19
Since the Court’s decision in ARAMCO, the Court has strengthened the
presumption. In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. the Court clarified
that for a statute to apply extraterritorially, it must state explicitly that it does
so.20 The Court there said courts ought not to interpret whether Congress
would have intended the statute to apply extraterritorially, stating:
The results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what
Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation
before the court—demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Rather than guess anew in each case,
we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable
background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.21
Morrison held that a “clear indication” of Congressional intent is necessary to get around the presumption.22 Morrison involved Australian stockholders suing an Australian bank whose stock was not directly listed in the
United States, alleging securities violations.23 The Court focused on the fact
that the bulk of the allegedly fraudulent actions occurred overseas, and the
harm the plaintiffs suffered similarly occurred on foreign soil.24
The Supreme Court has strengthened the presumption even more since
Morrison. While Morrison required only a clear indication, the Court in RJR
Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community went even further, requiring that Congress “affirmatively and unmistakably” indicate a statute’s extraterritorial

17

E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (finding that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act did not apply to a Lebanese-born American citizen working in Arabian
American Oil Co’s (ARAMCO’s) Saudi Arabian offices, because of the presumption
against extraterritorial application).
18
Id. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
19
Id. at 259.
20
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
21
Id. at 261.
22
Id. at 255.
23
Id. at 252–53.
24
Id. at 273 (noting that “all aspects of the purchases complained of by those petitioners
who still have live claims occurred outside the United States” and dismissing the claims
for lack of jurisdiction as a result).
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application.25 In that case, the European Community and its member states
sued RJR Nabisco in U.S. federal court for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), arguing that RJR had engaged
in a money laundering scheme.26 Like Morrison, the conduct about which the
plaintiffs complained occurred almost entirely overseas, as did the harm suffered. The plaintiffs brought their action under RICO’s private right of action.27 The Court, while it did find that Congress intended RICO’s prohibitions to apply overseas, applied the intent test separately to the private right
of action provision.28
Outside the financial arena, the Court has similarly limited the ability of
foreign plaintiffs to sue in U.S. courts for conduct occurring abroad. In its line
of cases dealing with the Alien Torts Statute, the Court has progressively limited the scope of the action available to foreign plaintiffs.29
The unifying theme of all these lines of litigation is that United States
courts should not hear claims that do not concern the United States. This principle, on its face, is simple and agreeable. And in the context of civil litigation
brought by foreign plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has been more than willing
to enforce this.30 But when the United States is participating as a litigant, either in a prosecutorial role or as a civil plaintiff—for example, when it brings
a civil enforcement action—the government is willing to advocate for a much
more expansive view of U.S. authority to adjudicate disputes.31
In contrast to the restrained attitude towards civil complaints, U.S. prosecutors have taken a nearly global view of their authority. In a guidance document describing the scope of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the
25
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016); see also Pamela
K. Bookman, Doubling Down on Litigation Isolationism, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 57, 57-58
(2016) (arguing that the Congressional intent requirement in RJR Nabisco is in fact more
burdensome to foreign plaintiffs than the Morrison requirement).
26
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2098.
27
Id. at 2106.
28
Id. (“[L]ogic requires that we separately apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to RICO’s cause of action despite our conclusion that the presumption has been overcome with respect to RICO’s substantive prohibitions.”).
29
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (noting the problems with
creating a private right of action for foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants); Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 598 U.S. 108, 117 (2013) (noting the potential negative
foreign policy implications of creating private rights of action for foreign plaintiffs).
30
Bookman, supra note 25, at 57–58.
31
For instance, note the contrast between the Department of Justice’s position regarding
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act with that taken in civil cases. Compare CRIMINAL DIV.
OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND THE ENF’T DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), https://www.justi
ce.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf with Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC
(2017) (No. 16–499), 2017 WL 2792284 (noting the Government’s position that clearing
alone is not a sufficient domestic nexus).
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DOJ and the SEC have stated that, in their view, the mere routing of transactions through the United States is enough to subject participants to United
States criminal financial law.32 DOJ officials have entered into deferred prosecution agreements with foreign companies for exactly the type of foreign
conduct that civil plaintiffs cannot bring in United States courts.33 In that case,
the DOJ explicitly relied on the fact that several of the transactions in question
were wired electronically through the United States.34
This apparent inconsistency in treatment is not entirely without justification. As the Supreme Court noted, there are additional foreign policy concerns
involved when creating a private right of action, compared to enforcement by
U.S. officials of U.S. law.35 However, the Court’s somewhat strained logic in
Jesner is illustrative of the eventual limit of such distinctions. A decision on
the extraterritoriality of dollar-clearing operations cannot distinguish between
civil and criminal sanctions—the conduct is either connected to the U.S. or it
is not. This civil-criminal divide in the application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality is unsustainable in the long run.
B. International Law Limiting Countries’ Abilities to Promulgate and
Enforce Legislation with Extraterritorial Effects
Technically, there is no absolute prohibition against universal prescriptive
jurisdiction in international law. However, in practice, it is reserved for extraordinary circumstances and is generally discouraged. Indeed, there is
thought to be a norm regarding the universal applicability of certain particularly egregious crimes, such as genocide or crimes against humanity.36 In fact,
163 of 193 UN Member states have enacted laws of universal jurisdiction relating to crimes against humanity.37 The application of universal prescriptive
jurisdiction beyond these well-worn and widely agreed upon areas, however,
is a far more controversial prospect.38
32

See supra note 10.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00260
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 06, 2011); see also Lauren Ann Ross, Note, Using Foreign Relations Law
to Limit Extraterritorial Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 DUKE L.J.
445, 447 (2012) (“a Japanese company haled into court in Texas for conduct . . . initiated
in Europe, the effects of which were felt in Africa.”).
34
Ross, supra note 33, at 447.
35
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (noting the problems with
creating a private right of action for foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants); Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013) (noting the potential negative
foreign policy implications of creating private rights of action for foreign plaintiffs).
36
Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around the World,
AMNESTY INT’L (2012), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/ior530192
012en.pdf.
37
Id. at 12.
38
See generally Universal Jurisdiction, INT’L JUSTICE RES. CTR., https://ijrcenter.org/ca
33
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Unlike in the domestic sphere, international law operates in a negative
space. In one of the earliest and most influential international cases, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) (the League of Nations predecessor to the International Court of Justice) stated that states, as independent sovereigns, are generally free to do as they wish and assert their jurisdiction
anywhere they see fit—assuming there is not a specific restriction imposed by
international law.39
States do not have free license to assert their jurisdiction and exercise their
power anywhere, however. The PCIJ noted in the Lotus Case that while states
theoretically have jurisdiction globally, “the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State [sic] is that—failing the existence of
a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form
in the territory of another State.”40 Because of the exclusive right of sovereign
states to govern their own territory, there is a general presumption against
states passing and enforcing laws that would regulate conduct in the territory
of other states.41 The Lotus Case and the Island of Palmas Case both illustrate
the general principle that a state’s ability to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction is a matter of international law, not just the state’s domestic law.
As international law has developed and the world has globalized, the validity of a state’s exercise of jurisdiction has shifted away from that of a pure
territorial understanding to looking at whether the state has a “sufficient connection” to the regulated conduct under several “general principles of jurisdiction.”42
Perhaps the most well-established principle is that states may generally
regulate the conduct of their own citizens abroad. This is known as the “active
nationality principle.”43 More controversial is the “passive personality
ses-before-national-courts/domestic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction/ (last visited Oct. 5,
2019) (discussing the scope and application of universal jurisdiction in foreign countries).
39
S.S. “Lotus”, Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7):
International law governs relations between independent States. The
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view
to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence
of States cannot therefore be presumed.
40
Id.
41
“[The] principle of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own territory
. . . [is] the point of departure in settling most questions that concern international relations.” Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Award 829, 838 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1928).
42
Menno T. Kamminga, Extraterritoriality, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L
LAW ¶10 (2012), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-978
0199231690-e1040?rskey=9rWvEm&result=1&prd=EPIL#.
43
Id. at ¶11.
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principle”, which allows states to regulate foreign conduct which injures its
own nationals.44 In both cases, however, the state asserting jurisdiction can
show a direct and tangible link to its own interests—namely the protection
and regulation of its own citizens.
More controversial still is the so-called “protective principle” of jurisdiction, where a state regulates foreign conduct based on the perceived harm that
such conduct will cause to the state’s interests.45 This principle covers conduct
such as terrorism, forgery, and other crimes related to national security.46 Increasingly, however, it is also used to regulate financial transactions and securities transactions.47 This is the theory that the United States asserts in order
to regulate financial activity abroad that could have a significant impact on
the stability of United States financial markets. United States courts couch the
protective principle as an “effects test”.48 This principle is not on its face controversial, but the difficulty comes in trying to find a discernable limit on what
constitutes a significant enough effect to justify invoking this principle of jurisdiction.49 Unlike the traditional national security basis, the “effect” of a financial transaction is often not targeted on the United States—and likely not
even intended. The application of an effects test for financial transactions is
not universally accepted as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law.50
Finally, international law generally recognizes the concept of universal jurisdiction, but only in limited and exceptional circumstances. Universal jurisdiction applies “only to certain crimes under international law that have been
made subject to universal jurisdiction either by a multilateral treaty or under
customary international law.”51 These include crimes such as genocide or
other crimes against humanity.52 Even in the human rights context, the exercise of universal jurisdiction is far from uncontroversial. In The Arrest Warrants Case, applicants to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) challenged
Belgium’s exercise of universal jurisdiction when four Rwandans were convicted in a Belgian court for crimes against humanity relating to the 1994
Rwandan Genocide.53 The ICJ overturned the challenged arrest warrant due
44

Id. at ¶12.
Id. at ¶13.
46
Id.
47
See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
48
Id. at 257–58.
49
See Kamminga, supra note 42, at ¶13 (“Although the validity of this principle is not
contested it provides a rather uncertain basis for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
because the conditions under which it may be relied upon are ill-defined.”).
50
Id.
51
Id. at ¶14.
52
Id.
53
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 15 (Feb. 14).
45
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to the fact that the target of the warrant was a government official in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and thus immune to suit in Belgium.54 The ICJ
did not address the validity of the Belgian law creating universal jurisdiction,
however.55 Many countries, especially in Europe, have laws creating universal
jurisdiction for genocide, torture, and other such crimes.
It is important to note that while there are international norms regarding
when a state may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, international law does
not actually create such jurisdiction. States, as sovereign entities, are free to
pass laws which take effect anywhere. International law instead merely creates norms of behavior that proscribe states from exercising their jurisdiction
outside these areas.
International law provides a normative hierarchy for enforcement when
the laws of multiple countries apply. Traditionally, a state enforcing law based
on its territorial jurisdiction has a right of enforcement superseding that of a
state seeking to enforce a law of universal jurisdiction.56 Reading between the
lines, the extraterritorial application of laws is therefore an exception to the
norm, and one that appears to be reserved for exceptional circumstances (or
cases of bilateral agreement to let one country prosecute).
International law therefore presents a clear norm of not applying law extraterritorially outside certain circumstances. This norm should still stand
even when the conduct in question might be “territorial” on the routing of a
circuit board, but which is still predominantly taking place in a country other
than the United States.
III. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF ELECTRONIC DOLLARCLEARING
Each year globally, the United States Dollar is used in transactions totaling
in the trillions of dollars.57 These transactions are often the products of lengthy
negotiation and contract drafting processes. As lawyers, there is a tendency to
think that once a check is transferred or a wire ordered, the deal is over. This,
however, only begins another process which can have unforeseen consequences for the parties to the original transaction. Unless a transaction is conducted in cash, the transaction must be “cleared” so that one party’s account
is debited, and the other party’s is credited for the same amount.58 In 1770,
54

Id. at ¶ 71.
Id. at ¶ 41.
56
Bernard H. Oxman, Jurisdiction of States, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L
LAW ¶51 (2007) (“[I]n general, territorial jurisdiction is primary and that extraterritorial
jurisdiction must be restrained in deference to the policies of the State where the act or
omission occurs.”).
57
Will Kenton, What is Fedwire?, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.investop
edia.com/terms/f/fedwire.asp.
58
James Chen, Clearing, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/t
55
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clerks for several London banks began meeting nightly in a tavern to centrally
clear the checks that had been deposited at the various banks. This centralized
process saved massive amounts of time and money rather than having clerks
shuttle between banks individually.59 In the intervening centuries, the clearing
process has been digitized to occur nearly instantaneously with almost no human interaction.60
In 2015, the Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) processed over $1.5 trillion in transactions daily.61 CHIPS is a private clearinghouse jointly owned by around fifty global financial institutions.62 Essentially
every large-scale transaction involving the U.S. Dollar goes through CHIPS.63
Additionally, many transactions routed through CHIPS do not even directly
involve the U.S. Dollar. Instead, they are transactions between two currencies
which may not easily be exchanged, where the dollar is used as an intermediary currency to facilitate exchange.64
The status of CHIPS (or other U.S-based clearing systems, such as FedWire) as the institution of choice for dollar-clearing, however, is far from a
permanent fixture of the global economy. In response to U.S. civil and criminal sanctions imposed on the basis of dollar-clearing operations, foreign banks
have started exploring alternatives to U.S.-based operations. Currencies such
as the Chinese Renminbi or the Euro are increasingly used as alternative transaction currencies.65 As currency exchanges become increasingly de-centralized and formerly radical alternatives like cryptocurrency become more mainstream, other financial centers could easily emerge as the hubs of electronic
commerce. For now, however, the clearing of “payments through New York
is a routine and universal aspect of the international financial system.”66
Given the potential for disruption and the longstanding reluctance of the
United States to subject itself to foreign or international legal restrictions, the
erms/c/clearing.asp.
59
Minouche Shafik, Deputy Governor, Bank of England, Speech: A New Heart for a
Changing Payments System, 2 (Jan. 27, 2016).
60
Id.
61
CHIPS, CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/chips
(last visited Jan. 25, 2020).
62
Id.
63
Machreqbank P.S.C. v. Ahmen Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros., 989 N.Y. S.2d 458 (N.Y.
2014) (quoting EDMUND M.A. KWAW, LAW & PRACTICE OF OFFSHORE BANKING & FINANCE
19 (1996) (“all wholesale international transactions involving the
use of the dollar go through CHIPS . . .”).
64
Brief for the Institute of International Bankers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, p. 13–14, Jesner v. Arab Bank, P.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 1432, 2017 WL 4325882.
65
Ernest T. Patrikis, Will Enforcement of US Sanctions Reshape How US-Dollar Transactions Are Cleared?, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Sept. 2014), https://www.financierworldwi
de.com/will-enforcement-of-us-sanctions-reshape-how-us-dollar-transactions-are-cleared
/#.XaCmbedKiu1.
66
Brief for Institute of International Bankers, supra note 64, at 14.
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current precedent of routine currency-clearing operations serving as a basis
for functionally universal jurisdiction is unsustainable.
A. Previous U.S. Treatment of Dollar-Clearing Operations in Relation to
Extraterritoriality
The United States has not clearly articulated a standard for the treatment
of dollar-clearing operations and whether or not they overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. As discussed previously, the various courts deciding Jesner and other ATS litigation have taken pains to avoid ruling definitively on the status of dollar-clearing. In addition to the deferred prosecution
agreement United States v. JGC, U.S. prosecutors have entered into similar
agreements with other banks based on their use of dollar-clearing operations.
Perhaps the single largest such action was the 2014 investigation into French
bank BNP Paribas, then the fifth-largest bank in the world.67
Prosecutors charged the bank with skirting U.S.-imposed sanctions on
Iran, Sudan, and Cuba specifically relating to BNP Paribas’s energy and commodities trading business.68 At the time of the investigation, BNP maintained
offices in New York for the purposes of dollar-clearing transactions, and some
of the transactions in question were routed—for the purposes of clearing—
through CHIPS and FedWire.69
Prosecutors initially sought more than a $10 billion dollar fine, but BNP
Paribas pled guilty and paid over $8 billion.70 In addition to the fine, New
York State’s financial regulatory authority suspended BNP Paribas’s ability
to conduct dollar-clearing for a year, forcing the bank to contract with other
institutions in order to maintain critical clearing operations.71 While BNP
Paribas’s case did not hinge solely on the bank’s dollar-clearing operation,
prosecutors used the bank’s reliance on U.S. clearing operations as a “hook”
to force the bank to enter settlement negotiations.
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In perhaps the most tenuous application of U.S. law to dollar-clearing
transactions, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) fined two banks in
Singapore for violating sanctions against Iran.72 There, the banks did not even
clear the transactions through the United States – Singapore, along with Hong
Kong, Tokyo, and Manilla are the only official overseas clearing centers (due
to the time difference).73 Even though the actual transaction occurred in Singapore, OFAC took the position that because the Federal Reserve supplies
some of the funds used to settle clearing imbalances, the Singaporean banks
had caused U.S. financial instruments to be transferred to Iran in violation of
U.S. sanctions.74 In all these actions, U.S. prosecutors have rested a significant
portion of their authority on the assumption that clearing a transaction is the
same as conducting the transaction. However, like many such actions against
large financial corporations, the banks in question entered into guilty pleas or
deferred prosecution agreements, and thus did not subject prosecutors’ assertions of authority to full judicial review and challenge.
Few U.S. courts have spoken directly on the territoriality of dollar-clearing
operations. The New York Court of Appeals in Mashreqbank PSC found that
dollar-clearing would not support jurisdiction in New York State Court.75
However, that same court only two years prior had answered a certified question from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, finding that a foreign bank’s
maintenance of a correspondent bank account with another bank for the purposes of dollar-clearing was a “transaction” within the jurisdiction of New
York’s long-arm statute.76 Both cases, however, were civil actions brought by
foreign plaintiffs. While the reliance on a long-arm statute would suggest that
Licci was a determination of personal jurisdiction, rather than extraterritoriality, the same underlying logic would apply. The Licci court’s determination
that the transactions “happened” in New York—and thus were within the
scope of New York’s long arm statute—would also mean that the transaction
was territorial, or not subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Much like the broader question of extraterritoriality, it would seem that
dollar-clearing is treated differently in the civil and the criminal contexts. In
all cases, however, the same conduct is in question. A decisive ruling on
whether dollar-clearing is sufficient contact with the United States to get
around the presumption against extraterritoriality would theoretically apply
equally to civil and criminal cases.
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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF DOLLAR-CLEARING IN RELATION TO
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
A. Dollar-Clearing and the U.S. Presumption Against the Extraterritorial
Application of Legislation
To date, few U.S. courts have squarely addressed whether dollar-clearing
operations touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. Currently, however, there is
no unified doctrine for determining the whether or not a given action overcomes the presumption of extraterritoriality. Circuit Courts of Appeals are
split on whether the inquiry is context-specific, or whether a given action’s
status is dependent on the type of action in the case.
In the realm of securities actions, Morrison clearly establishes the focus
test as the proper inquiry.77 Morrison did not displace the presumption when
securities transactions were traded as part of a fraudulent scheme, because
although the scheme was operated from the United States, the actual transactions occurred in Australia.78 The Supreme Court concluded that the “focus”
of the Securities Exchange Act was on actual securities transactions, rather
than the related activities of the scheme.79
Circuit courts have not uniformly applied Morrison’s focus test outside of
the securities realm. In Kiobel, the Supreme Court ruled that to displace the
presumption in Alien Torts Statute litigation, the actions in question must
“touch and concern” the United States.80 Several circuits have interpreted Kiobel II to displace Morrison’s focus test, while others have viewed Kiobel II
as a different wording of the same focus test from Morrison.81
The Court in RJR Nabisco v. European Community attempted to clarify
the analytical framework, but some courts still analyze extraterritoriality in
the ATS context differently than they analyze extraterritoriality for other statutes.82 The Ninth Circuit, in Mujica v. AirScan, Inc.,83 laid out a multifactor
analysis, looking at more than the just the conduct at the “focus” of the statute
to also incorporate factors such as the citizenship of the defendant(s) or the
corporate involvement of the parties in the United States.84 In either case,
77
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whether under Morrison’s focus test or the Ninth Circuit’s broader interpretation, corporate presence alone is not enough to displace the presumption.85
The reasoning of the various courts would also suggest that dollar-clearing
alone should not displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. Certainly, dollar-clearing in the United States, whether through a correspondent
bank account or a U.S. branch, is more of a U.S. connection than mere corporate presence alone. However, dollar-clearing as a basis for jurisdiction would
not meet the factors set out by the courts for overcoming the presumption.
First, dollar-clearing, at least in isolation, is not an activity that is “focused” on the United States. By definition dollar-clearing is an ancillary activity, given that it is an essentially mechanical function. And it is an activity
that can occur without human intervention—and perhaps even without either
party to the transaction knowing that it is occurring.86
In the criminal context, U.S. courts have even suggested that the Fifth
Amendment may limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law.
The Second and Ninth Circuits, among others, have held that prosecution in
the United States requires a sufficient nexus such that it is fair to the defendant.87 Certainly, there are significant differences between the requirements for
civil and criminal legislation. But as previously stated, the extraterritoriality
of dollar-clearing would implicate both civil and criminal liability, as it would
overcome the presumption regardless of the action being brought. Indeed, in
the financial world, U.S. courts have more willingly displaced the presumption in the criminal context than in the civil.88
In the criminal context, dollar-clearing alone would not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality in part because its application to foreign
defendants would not be “fair” under the above-reasoned analysis. Arguably,
dollar-clearing would present even less of a connection to the United States
than corporate presence, which does not overcome the presumption when
standing alone. Unlike corporate presence, parties to a transaction may engage
in dollar-clearing actions without “knowing” that it occurs. Moreover, banks
that engage in dollar-clearing operations, especially through correspondent
accounts with other financial institutions, are not availing themselves of
United States jurisdiction. Rather, they are availing themselves of the currency. As many have noted, dollar-clearing is a functional necessity, rather
than a conscious choice. As the Mashreqbank court observed, “[a]ll wholesale
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international transactions involving the use of the dollar go through CHIPS.”89
Under the Second and Ninth circuit’s due process analysis for extraterritorial
application, this economic necessity would seemingly not constitute the availment implied by a fairness analysis. The use of dollar-clearing operations, especially through a correspondent account, is no more of an “availment” than
paying with U.S. dollars in cash.
B. Dollar-Clearing Under International Law
Like under domestic law, dollar-clearing as a territorial action is counter
to traditional notions of jurisdiction. While there is not the direct case law as
there is domestic law, none of the traditionally accepted basses for state jurisdiction would support the United States’ exercise of jurisdiction based on dollar-clearing alone.
In a hypothetical case of “pure” dollar-clearing, or a case where dollarclearing alone is the purported basis for jurisdiction, only the effects basis and
the territorial basis would sustain jurisdiction (assuming that there are no
grounds for the exercise of universal jurisdiction). The only argument for the
effects principle supporting jurisdiction would be that the clearing of suspect
transactions through the United States would weaken the integrity or perception of the country’s financial system. Countries face severe negative consequences, both formal and informal, for allowing unfettered access to financial
institutions and failing to prosecute those who use them unscrupulously.90 Unlike most countries, however, the actions in question here are relatively minor,
and the U.S. extensively regulates financial institutions that actively conduct
business in the United States.91 Additionally, the ubiquity and volume of dollar-clearing operations may actually undermine and prevent negative international perception. Given the volume of transactions, and their importance to
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foreign financial institutions, the U.S. would likely not be subject to the same
expectations that other countries are.
The territoriality principle also would not support the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States. There is no international equivalent to the “touch
and concern” standard from Kiobel.92 The same factual considerations are at
play, however, even if the threshold is more amorphous. As discussed previously, dollar-clearing transactions involve conduct that is mostly outside the
United States. The actual action in the United States may be nothing more
than electronic signals on a circuit board.93 Additionally, unlike piracy or
other crimes on the high seas, there is conduct also occurring in another country. And in the case of a “pure” dollar-clearing transaction, significantly more
of the activity would be occurring outside the United States than in it.
V. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The U.S. has traditionally been relatively active in applying its laws outside its own territory, and this has been the source of significant international
friction.94 Historically, the European Union has been especially critical of
U.S. enforcement against actions European countries viewed as extraterritorial. In 1980, the United Kingdom passed the Protection of Trading Interests
Act, which provided claw-back provisions and blocking measures to stop the
enforcement of U.S. antitrust judgements.95 The Trade Secretary stated the
aim of the act was “to reassert and reinforce the defences of the United Kingdom against attempts by other countries to enforce their economic and commercial policies unilaterally on us.”96 France also has previously enacted legislation aimed at limiting U.S. enforcement of economic laws in France.97
While U.S. courts often consider extraterritoriality from the perspective of
preserving U.S. judicial resources, foreign countries impacted by U.S. judgments view application of U.S. law abroad as a “unilateral instrument of
American hegemony.”98 This effect is amplified when the U.S. will apply
criminal sanctions overseas but will not provide the same access to court for
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foreign plaintiffs.99 Given the tense relationship between U.S. extraterritorial
jurisdiction and foreign allies, the U.S. should tread carefully when its actions
could affect international norms regarding extraterritoriality.
VI. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DECISIVELY RESOLVE THE STATUS OF
DOLLAR-CLEARING AND FIND THAT IT ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH TO
IMPLICATE U.S. JURISDICTION
Given the potential for international repercussions and disruptions to the
global financial system, the United States should conclusively resolve the issue of dollar-clearing as it relates to territorial jurisdiction. The first and most
important element of this is that courts should be wary of accepting jurisdiction based on this conduct. Allowing jurisdiction based only on dollar-clearing
would create an invasive norm and take away the legislative and executive
branches’ ability to consider economic and foreign policy implications and
selectively implement laws with extraterritorial application. Second, the U.S.
should actively pursue an international agreement or norm restraining the exercise of jurisdiction based on currency clearing operations.
A. U.S. Courts Should Not Interpret Dollar-Clearing Operations as Actions
with Sufficient “Touch and Concern” to Displace the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality
In the relatively short history of ATS litigation, courts have consistently
been wary of creating litigation that has the potential to disrupt international
relations. In Jesner, the Court articulated a concern that its actions would create international discord, and that the political branches were better suited to
navigating the minefield of foreign policy concerns.100 This is the main concern underpinning the entire presumption against extraterritoriality—namely
that the courts are ill-equipped to consider the non-legal concerns that the political branches must consider.101
A decision affirming dollar-clearing as a basis for U.S. jurisdiction would
create an invasive new international norm and could lead to significant international tension. Many countries, including close allies, have objected to the
increasingly global application of U.S. law.102 Moreover, a finding that
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clearing operations are territorial would be a blunt instrument. Congress, in
crafting legislation, has the ability to specify exactly which legislation would
or would not have an extraterritorial effect. In contrast, a judicial decision
would presumably apply to all causes of action, civil or criminal.
Additionally, due to the dichotomy between international law and domestic law, a U.S. ruling about the territoriality of dollar-clearing would not obviate the United States of a perceived breach of international norms regarding
universal jurisdiction. Assuming that dollar-clearing is internationally perceived as non-territorial, a domestic court decision to the contrary does not
validate the U.S.’s position internationally. Instead, it merely removes the political branches’ ability to selectively apply U.S. law extraterritorially and in
compliance with international norms.
B. The United States Should Actively Pursue a Restrained Agreement or
Norm Regarding the Territoriality of Financial Transactions at the
International Level
Whereas the United States should tread lightly at the domestic level, it
should actively seek the creation of agreeable norms at the international level.
Presently, there is little, if any, agreement on how to prevent conflicting regulations at the international level.103 The potential for overlap is significant,
and it can sometimes lead to situations where compliance with the two regimes asserting jurisdiction is impossible—compliance in one jurisdiction
may virtually ensure a violation in the other.104 In the past, there have been
attempts to create a unified system for resolving these potential conflicts.105
In order to create a robust international framework for resolving such conflicts, however, states must make an effort to curtail their own domestic requirements so as to create room in the international space.106
In the specific realm of currency clearing, the United States is uniquely
positioned to shape international norms regarding jurisdiction. The United
States Dollar is the overwhelming reserve currency of the world, and the
United States has more currency clearing activity than any other nation.
United States financial law has an enormous influence on other legal systems
and international legal frameworks. The United States, therefore, is in a
103
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position to shape international norms through its own treatment of currency
clearing’s effect on prescriptive jurisdiction. U.S. law recognizing currency
clearing as not being a “territorial” activity will go a long way in establishing
an international trend, if not norm, in the same direction.
In order to effectuate this, however, the U.S. must state its reasons for
change in a decidedly international way. The creation of international law requires either treaty or customary practice.107 In the case of agreement, international cooperation is obviously required. For the creation of international
norms, however, customary practice and opinio juris are both required.108 As
the center of global finance, U.S. actions with respect to currency clearing is
the customary practice of the world. To demonstrate opinion juris, however,
the United States must give some indication that a restrained treatment of dollar-clearing is not only a strategic choice, but one that is compelled by some
legal obligation.109
The United States has a long history of hesitance towards engagement with
international law. Due to the unique position of the U.S. in the realm of currency clearing, however, the U.S. cannot withdraw. Instead, the U.S. must
engage with international law, so as to create norms of conduct beneficial to
long-term U.S. interests.
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